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GENERAL HEADINGS.

Current Topics.

The Termination of the War.

THE GREAT WAR is now officially at an end. An Order in Council, duly made under the Termination of the Present War (Definition) Act, 1918, declares that it terminated at midnight of 31st August, 1921. Perhaps it may be open to argument whether the Order complies with the requirements of the statute, inasmuch as Turkey is excepted from its scope. We need not enter into these questions just now, since we hope at an early date to publish some detailed comment on the Order, and on the legal situation which it creates, in an article or short series of articles.

D.O.R.A. and the New Order.

ONE OF THE chief effects of the Order is that it terminates the operation of the D.O.R.A. and the Regulations made thereunder, except in so far as these are expressly preserved, either by the War Emergency Laws (Continuance) Act of 1920, or the Restoration of Order (Ireland) Act, 1920. Of course, most of the regulations made under the Act have already been revoked by Order in Council; the statute itself, we need hardly say, contains no regulations, but merely gives power to issue them by Order in Council. In the "Statutory Rules and Orders, 1920," there is a table showing which of the D.O.R.A. Regulations had been revoked or amended prior to the 31st December, 1920. A few have been revoked since. The chief example of the latter is Regulation 9B, which established Board of Trade control over the mines; this was revoked in March under circumstances familiar to the public, since it was followed by the lengthy and disastrous coal strike. In the case of such regulations as still remain in force, the assent of the Attorney-General is necessary to a prosecution, and the penalty is limited to a fine of £100 or three months' imprisonment. Of course, this does not apply in the case of Ireland, which is governed by the special statute named above.

D.O.R.A. Regulations and the Pre-War Status.

OF COURSE, it is hardly necessary to say that even the complete revocation of D.O.R.A. and its Regulations would not restore the pre-war status of individual liberty in respect of many of the matters with which it is concerned. The war necessarily led to numerous restrictions on the private rights of subjects, both as regards their property, their persons, and their conduct. Some of those restrictions have either proved beneficial for purposes other than the successful conduct of military operations, or are believed by our rulers to have so proved. They have therefore been kept in force. And the inevitable alteration of social conditions due to the war has led to a similar retention of restrictions once intended to be temporary only. These alterations have

been made by means of special statutes. The Licensing Act, and Licensing Rules, of course, are the most striking example of this; but the Firearms Act, 1920, and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, are other illustrations which are of great importance in actual legal practice. The temporary Suspension of Grand Juries and the limitation of juries in civil cases are likely to be retained more or less permanently; but probably recent amendments of the jury system—especially the position of women on juries—will require overhauling in some comprehensive amending statute at an early date. Two Regulations which have disappeared as from 31st August are Regulation 3, which gave power to requisition premises to any competent naval or military or air force authority; and Regulation 22, which prohibits the possession of wireless apparatus save with the consent of the Postmaster-General. But it is not unlikely that both may be renewed in some new statutory form, since the war has shown the inadequacy of previous powers possessed by the War Office and other authorities charged with national defence. Three statutes in the nature of war emergency measures which are not, of course, affected by the lapse of the Defence of the Realm Act, but which are by their own terms or by the "Continuance" Act given only a limited duration, are the Courts Emergency Powers Acts, the Rent Restriction Acts, and the Summer Time Act. The first and last expire on 31st August, 1922, and the second on 1st July, 1923. But it seems unlikely, at present, that the Rent Restriction Act will be allowed to finally disappear in 1923; some renewal of its provisions on modified terms seems probable unless the housing question has made more progress towards solution than seems at present likely.

The International Law Conference.

THE HAGUE International Law Conference completed its sittings on Saturday. Needless to say, the occasion was one of the utmost public importance, owing to the effect of the war on many previously accepted doctrines of International Law. Lord BIRKENHEAD had intended to be present, but at the last moment was compelled to decline the office of President, since "the present state of public affairs" in England compelled his attendance elsewhere. Perhaps the most useful piece of work actually agreed to by all was the report and rules as to Maritime Law, drafted by the Maritime Law Committee of the International Law Association. Sir HENRY DUKE, as President of the Admiralty Division, naturally had greatly interested himself in this report, and its adoption was generally ascribed to his tact and diplomacy. A *quaestio vexata* was the definition of the risks to be assumed by sea-carriers under bills of lading. But here Sir HENRY DUKE succeeded in obtaining general agreement. All the delegates were greatly impressed by the hospitality of the Dutch Government and local authorities. Canning once complained to his ambassador at The Hague in well-known terms:—

"In commerce, dear Bagot, the fault of the Dutch,
Is giving too little and asking too much."

but there was a universal feeling among the members of the conference that no such charge could be levelled against their Dutch hosts of to-day. In many speeches the feeling was expressed that the guests were giving too little, and getting too much; a pleasant inversion of the old point of view. In every way the Conference was a great success.

Domicile and Bankruptcy Jurisdiction.

A QUESTION carefully considered by the conference was the position of bankrupts who have assets in more than one country. It is obviously desirable to have one uniform liquidation of the bankrupt's affairs in which a uniform set of rules as to availability of assets and priority of debts can be applied. Helpful suggestions on the subject were made in a paper by Mr. VALENTINE BALL, who advocated the test of commercial domicile in any country as the basis of bankruptcy jurisdiction. The courts of the country of such domicile should exercise over the bankrupt the same powers in relation to bankruptcy as they were entitled to exercise in relation to any one of their own citizens; and from the point of view of international law a judgment or order declaring a man bankrupt should be recognised in every other country, provided that it was shown that the debtor had a commercial domicile in the country in which the order was made against him. He suggested that it should be established as a principle in international law that for the exercise of jurisdiction a mere commercial domicile, obtained by (*a*) residence; or (*b*) the carrying on of business, whether personally or by agent; or (*c*) by being a member of a firm carrying on business, should be regarded as sufficient to give the domestic tribunals of all countries such jurisdiction in bankruptcy that decree pronounced, even in the absence of the debtor, would be recognised in other countries.

The Execution of Foreign Judgments.

ANOTHER important point discussed by the Conference related to the "Recognition of the Effects of Foreign Judgments." Meinheer KORTERS, one of the Dutch judges, read a very interesting paper which deserves attention. The paper was directed to the achievement of a thoroughly practical object. It was designed to prepare the way, by a collective treaty, for a solution of the much discussed questions relating to the judicial effect of recognising foreign judgments. The rules concerning the matter vary greatly in the different countries. In England and the United States, for instance, the principles are divergent from those in other countries. They do not permit the execution of foreign judgments, and they require fresh proceedings to be taken before their tribunals, although the decision of the foreign tribunal is deemed to be *primâ facie* evidence of the basis of the new claim. But ordinarily the plaintiff would win his case, and it would be only in exceptional circumstances that the defendant could hope to succeed. Some States have already agreed by individual treaties to recognise the effect of the judgments emanating from their respective Courts. A collective treaty which, in the vast domain of commercial and civil life generally, would remove the difficulties which hindered the execution of foreign judgments still remains to be made. If it is desired to regulate efficaciously the execution of foreign judgments by an international treaty it is necessary to start with the idea that the foreign Judge deserves full confidence, and that his decision should be respected in principle by all the contracting States. A possible solution would be an International Court for the execution of foreign judgments; but such a proposal seems to be far distant from practical politics.

Bonus Shares and Super-Tax.

THE RECENT decision of the House of Lords that "bonus shares" are not subject to super-tax probably came as a surprise to most practitioners. We printed last week an interesting article communicated by one who is an expert in company law, supporting strongly the view of the Final Court of Appeal. On the other hand, the contrary opinion of the late Mr. PALMER, quoted in that article, and the dissenting judgments of Lords DUNEDIN and SUMNER (*Commissioner of Inland Revenue* v. *Blott*, 1920, 2 K.B. 657) will have great weight with many minds. At any rate, the matter is now decided. The view taken by the House of Lords was that both in principle and on authority, when a company issues bonus shares instead of distributing profits, it has selected one of two permissible methods of dealing with the available funds, namely, capitalizing them instead of treating them as the current income of its members—or, in the language of economists, treating them as a "fund" to be added to the national saved wealth, instead of as a "flow" to be added to its spent wealth. The shareholder has no power to determine in which of these forms he receives his share, and if he in fact receives it as capital, then it is capital, not income. This reasoning has at least the merit of simplicity.

Capitalisation of Surplus Funds.

THIS CASE raised specifically the point as to whether the respondent was liable to an assessment to super-tax in respect of bonus shares issued by a company. In this case the company had by its articles of association power to increase its capital

and to distribute its profits in the usual manner, including a distribution of paid-up shares in that or any other company. It had also the usual power to create reserve funds. In 1914 the company had available for distribution, including a small carry over, the sum of £61,903. After carrying £10,000 to the general reserve fund and paying a dividend on the preference and ordinary shares, a bonus of 33⅓ per cent. on the ordinary shares was declared on the recommendation of the directors, such bonus to be satisfied by a distribution among the shareholders of shares in the company credited as fully paid. In the year ended the 5th April, 1914, the respondent received a lot of such distribution shares, and again a further lot of shares in respect of the year ended the 5th April, 1915. Having been assessed to super-tax in respect of those allotments of shares, the respondent took the point that he was not liable to be assessed to super-tax because the shares allotted were capital and not income. The shareholder had no option but to receive the bonus in shares. The Courts below decided in favour of the respondent and the commissioners appealed with the result that the House of Lords by a majority took the view that super-tax was not assessable.

Solicitors and Confidential Communications.

A QUESTION not yet decided in an English Courts has just been considered in America in *O'Brien* v. *New England Mutual Insurance Co., Kan.*, 197 Pacific Reports 1100. A solicitor, of course, cannot be compelled to answer questions as to communications between his client and himself in the capacity of legal adviser of that client if that client claims privilege. But, in an independent set of proceedings, to which the client is not a party, and where he expressly disclaims any objection to the question, can the solicitor himself refuse to answer on the ground that the communication is privileged? The American Court held that he could, apparently on the ground that, in the public interest, such privilege is necessary for the protection of lawyers as well as of their clients.

The Cabinet of Inverness.

THE SUMMONING of a Cabinet when the King is at Moy House, the seat of The Mackintosh of Mackintosh, not far from Inverness, will recall to some readers who may be interested in the historical and literary associations of the law, memories of an older age, and the redoubtable Lord President Duncan Forbes. For after Culloden, in 1746, when the Duke of Cumberland set forth to stamp out the last embers of the Jacobite rebellion by severe and vindictive measures, that seat of the Pretender's faithful followers in the Highlands, Inverness, was the chief centre from which his stern activities were exercised. And his chief assistant was the Whig Lord Advocate, Grant of Prestongrange, who ruled Scotland with an iron hand. The Lord Advocate, in those days, was an all-powerful person in Scotland. His power, indeed, resembled those of a French Chancellor in the days of Richelieu or Louis Quatorze, rather than those of any British Premier. He was sole Minister, for there existed no Secretary of State for Scotland in those days, and the Home Secretary was not expected to interfere in Scots affairs. Scotland, too, had no Lord Chancellor; the Lord Advocate exercised all his non-judicial functions. Indeed, to this day, although greatly shorn of his power, the Lord Advocate—as readers of the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL have probably by now fully grasped—is still in name and theory a member of the Scots Court of Sessions; it consists of the Lord President, the Lord Justice-Clerk—the Lord Advocate and the Lords Ordinary. The Lord Advocate, when he is present in Court, does not sit among the Bar, but at a special place—theoretically within the Bench, although not so in appearance—specially reserved for him. But a Lord Advocate to-day is greatly shorn of his old powers, whereas in the eighteenth century the Lords Advocate of Scotland were not less powerful than is an Indian District Collector within his District. The "Bluidy Mackenzie" in the days of Charles II, Grant of Prestongrange in the ten years succeeding Culloden, and Henry Dundas in the twenty years of the younger Pitt's English supremacy, were absolute despots who could do what they liked, or nearly so, in Scotland. Stevenson in "Catriona," of course has described in imperishable literary form the doings of Grant and the procedure of Scots criminal trials in those interesting far-off days.

Powers of Expulsion from Private Bodies.

THE Common Law of England, as a general rule, does not permit one private person to exercise the right of imposing *positive* sanctions upon another, such as corporal correction, forfeiture of property, and imprisonment; these functions are very properly reserved for public officers or magistrates. A limited exception occurs in the case of persons who are legally in a state of pupillage, such as infants, apprentices, and lunatics in the custody of their natural guardians. Nor does the law, as a rule, allow one person to obtain by contract the power of imposing on another fines or pecuniary penalties or forfeitures; both common law and equity lean against these. And even *negative* sanctions are viewed with disfavour by the law; boycotting and blacklisting have always been regarded with dislike as liable to abuse, and even combinations to avoid the society of an individual are odious to the law.

It is in accordance with this tendency that certain natural rights of a person's colleagues, business or social, are subjected by our law to very considerable limitations. At first sight, it might seem obvious that a man's partners should be able to expel him from the firm if ever they get dissatisfied with him. The expulsion of a discordant personality from a club seems equally a matter of obvious common right. So, too, the expulsion of a child from a school. And all those rights exist in law, but they have to be exercised with caution. The Common Law decidedly leans against them. A brief discussion of this in the light of a few more or less modern cases may be useful. We do not propose to refer to the right of expelling an individual from Parliament, or a local authority, or a professional body; for these are matters of public, not private, right; indeed, they are mostly regulated by statute. We shall confine ourselves strictly to matters *juris privati*. For this reason we exclude from consideration even the right to expel a child from a public elementary school, since this is largely regulated by the Education Code of 1910, ss. 51 to 53, which give power to refuse admission to a child on the ground of non-age, ill-health, and certain mental or physical defects, and perhaps on any "reasonable" ground (see the judgment of Channell, J., in *Wilford* v. *West Riding*, 1908, 1 K.B. 685, *et seq.*). The question of expelling a boy, from a school which is not controlled by the State, however, rests on a different footing and is within the ambit of this article.

The first case we will consider is the right of expulsion from a partnership. In the case of a partnership at will, of course, no question can arise; either partner can give notice to dissolve the partnership at any time. In the case of a partnership for a fixed term, however, the case is different. In certain cases the Partnership Act of 1890 empowers the partners to rescind the partnership or to obtain an order of rescission from the court; these are not relevant to our present purpose. The question we have to consider arises when the partnership deed vests in the majority of the partners express power to expel one of their number. Here the mode of exercising of the right is governed by one simple test, whether or not the deed gives power to expel in the event of a partner committing certain specified acts. If it does, then on proof that one of these acts has been committed, the majority have an absolute right to expel the partner without hearing his explanation; although if this right has been exercised *mala fide* for some improper reason, the court will restrain the partners from acting on it. If the deed does not specify the acts, then the partners must act judicially, as well as *bonâ fide*, and give an opportunity for an explanation to a partner before they expel him. This seems to be the broad general principle, as elucidated in *Green* v. *Howell* (1910, 1 Ch. 495).

The next case to be considered is that of a club or society in which all the members have a common interest in the assets of the institution. In such a case, the position is analogous to that of a partnership. In both the case of a firm and that of a mutual society, the member has not merely contractual rights, but a proprietary interest, either at common law or as a beneficiary in equity of property held in trust for the members. Therefore, such rights of property will be protected by the court against forfeiture. The result of this rule is that very strict proof is cast upon the ruling body that all conditions precedent to the existence of a right to expel have been satisfied. Some of these conditions are the creation of "natural justice and equity"; others of the regulations governing the club or society. Put shortly, they are four in number: First, the expelled person must have been found guilty of some act which, under the rules, can be penalized by the forfeiture of his privileges. Secondly, he must have been found guilty after a proper judicial enquiry in which reasonable rules of procedure have been observed, such as giving him notice of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself. Thirdly the judging body must act judicially and be composed of impartial persons; the presence of the accuser on the committee would probably invalidate its decision. Lastly, they must act *bonâ fide*. These rules would seem to follow clearly from the judgments of the Court of Appeal in the latest case, that of *Young* v. *Ladies' Imperial Club, Ltd.* (1920, 2 K.B. 523). The power of expelling a member is *not* inherent in a club or other society, a partnership, or a company. But if it is not in their constitution, the latter can usually be altered so as to insert it, provided its constitution provides for alteration of the rules at all. The alteration must be made *bonâ fide* and for the benefit of the members as a whole (per Lord Lindley, in *Allen* v. *Gold Reefs of West Africa, Ltd.*, 1900, 1 Ch. 656).

Some illustrations of this may be given. The rules must be strictly complied with, *e.g.*, every member of the committee possessing disciplinary powers must be properly summoned to the meeting before which the matter comes, even if he waives his right to a summons (*Re Portuguese Consolidated Mines, Ltd.*, 1889, 42 Ch. D. 161). Reasonable notice must be given to the accused (*Gray* v. *Allison*, 1909, 25 T.L.R. 531). Notice of the meeting must be given within the times provided by the rules; otherwise the proceedings are invalid (*Labouchere* v. *Wharncliffe*, 1879, 13 Ch. D. 346). These are only a few of the numerous decisions which illustrate the effect of irregularities on resolutions of expulsion.

Where the club or society is not mutual but the private enterprise of proprietors, the rights of a member depend on contract and not on the possession by him of a proprietary interest. It is therefore questionable how far, in such a case, he can claim an injunction to protect his membership. It is probable that in most cases his right is one of damages only (*Rigby* v. *Connol*, 1880, 14 Ch. D. 482). But even where a right is based solely upon contract, it may confer on the individual possessing it an irrevocable licence to use premises for the purposes contemplated in the contract, in which case he can possibly obtain an injunction.

In any event, whether the remedy be by injunction or only by damages, the member of such a club can only be expelled under the same circumstances as would be the case were the club one in which he had a proprietary or beneficial interest. To expel him otherwise amounts to breach of contract.

The right to expel a child from a school not governed by the Education Code for elementary schools is similar to the right of expulsion from a club. It depends on contract alone when the school is not endowed, but on the equitable proprietary rights of a beneficiary, if the boy is a scholar of an endowed school (*Wood* v. *Prestwich*, 27 T.L.R. 268). Generally speaking, it is not necessary to prove any formal act of procedure on the part of the school authority; the right to expel is vested in the headmaster (unless otherwise provided by the trust deed or by the contract between parent and master), and need only be exercised *bonâ fide* by him. Proof of judicial action is not necessary in his case (*ibidem*). The power, however, must not be exercised arbitrarily, but only in a case where such discipline is "reasonable" (per Cockburn, C.J., in *Fitzgerald* v. *Northcote*, 4 F. & F., at p. 685).

The Sale of Food Order 1921.

THE NEW Food Control Order, dated 16th August, which came into force on the 4th of September, is a very long Order of a somewhat ephemeral character, consisting of Parts I to VI, and a Schedule, which would occupy too much space were we to print it in full. But it will probably be of service to our readers if we summarize here its main provisions, and refer those interested to the Order itself, No. 1305 of 1921, for further details. The Order is issued by the Board of Trade under powers conferred by the Ministry of Food (Continuance) Act, 1920, and the Ministry of Food (Cessation) Order, 1921. Its main object evidently is to provide for the transition period between the termination of control and the resumption of pre-war freedom in the sale of food, if ever such freedom should be resumed.

Perhaps the most immediately important of the provisions of this new Order is one contained in s. 24, which repeals Orders named in the Schedule; of course, with the usual safeguard that the revocation is, "without prejudice to any proceedings in respect of any contravention thereof" (*ibidem*). The following is a list of the Orders in this Schedule:—

(1) The Bread Order, 1918.	S.R. & O., 1918, No. 547.
(2) The Tea (Net Weight) Order, 1917.	S.R. & O., 1917, No. 318.
(3) The Bacon, Ham and Lard (Sales) Order, 1921.	S.R. & O., 1921, No. 403.
(4) The Imported Meat (Labelling) Order (No. 2), 1919, as amended.	S.R. & O., 1919, No. 1733 & 1920, No. 858.
(5) The Eggs (Description on Sale) Order, 1920.	S.R. & O., 1920, No. 2408.
(6) The Jam (Sales) Order, 1920, as amended.	S.R. & O., 1920, No. 1512 & 1921, No. 215.
(7) The Dripping (Standard of Quality) Order, 1919.	S.R. & O., 1919, No. 511.
(8) The Edible Fats (Standard of Quality) Order, 1919.	S.R. & O., 1919, No. 658.

The remainder of the Order consists of five special parts and one general part. Each of the special parts deals with an important article of food, in respect of which it is desired to retain some of the restrictions and modifications of the law introduced during the war, or to add some additions to them in the interest of the consumer. Part I deals with the sale of bread; Part II, tea; Part III, imported produce (as respects labelling mainly); Part IV, jam; and Part V, fats. In each of these cases the Order makes rather important variations from the law as contained in the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, 1875 to 1907, as well as the relevant Orders, and therefore the provisions should be noted carefully.

In the case of bread, it is definitely provided that the sale must be by weight only (s. 1). This is a decided innovation. Hitherto the purchaser has been entitled to demand that the bread shall be weighed, and the vendor has been bound to possess weights and a scale for the purpose of complying with such a request. But a purchaser has hitherto been able to dispense with weighing on the part of the seller. Now, however, the vendor must sell by weight. The only exception arises where bread is sold for consumption on the premises, *e.g.*, in the case of a restaurant, in which case weighing is not required. Other provisions of Part I are that (1) a loaf of bread must weigh one pound or some multiple thereof; (2) no rolls exceeding two ounces in weight can be sold; (3) it is an offence to expose for sale or carry for sale or deliver under a contract of sale any bread which does not come within the permitted classes of weight mentioned above and (4) inspectors or other authorized persons may insist on the bread being weighed in their presence (*ibidem*, ss. 1 to 5). These are very drastic provisions and likely to lead to many difficulties. As everyone knows, bread rapidly loses weight as it cools owing to the evaporation of moisture. It is therefore the custom of

bakers to turn out of their ovens a loaf weighing an ounce or two more than its proper weight of one or two pounds, and if it cools below the full 16 ounces or 32 ounces respectively, to make up the difference by adding a roll or "piece." But now, under s. 4, bread which is exposed or carried for sale must weigh *exactly* one pound or some multiple thereof at all times that it is so "offered" or "exposed" or "carried" or "delivered"; otherwise there is an offence under the section. Obviously compliance with this provision in the literal sense is not physically possible; but how it is to be construed so as to give it a reasonable meaning will probably be a matter much disputed in Petty Sessional Courts.

The objects of Part II, which relates to tea, are somewhat similar to those of Part I. By s. 6 (*a*), all tea sold retail, whether contained in a package or not, must be sold by net weight. This, of course, is intended to get rid of the practice of selling the tea in a wrapper which states that the weight of the wrapper is included in the weight as sold. The sale must be in ounces or pounds and their multiples, except where an amount less than two ounces is sold. Section 6 (*b*) provides that the label, band, wrapper, or other covering of a package of tea must either contain no statement of its net weight or a true statement of that weight. It is also forbidden to offer or possess for sale by retail any package bearing an incorrect statement as to net weight. These provisions are probably inserted *ex abundanti cautelâ*, as probably the existing law would be strong enough to hit breaches of this obvious principle of honesty.

Part III, which relates to the labelling of imported produce, is a much more important provision of the statute. It relates to three separate kinds of produce, "meat" and "bacon" and "lard," each of which is given a statutory definition in s. 7 (*c*) as follows:—

> "Meat" shall include beef, mutton, lamb, pork and veal, but shall not include bacon or ham, or cooked, canned or potted meat, sausages or offals.
>
> "Bacon" shall include shoulders and picnics, but shall not include pickled pork or cured pigs' heads.
>
> "Lard" shall not include neutral lard or compound lard.

And a definition of "imported" is also given:—

> "Imported" shall mean, with respect to any bacon, ham or lard, cured or manufactured outside the United Kingdom, or cured or manufactured in the United Kingdom from pigs raised outside the United Kingdom.

The general rule laid down by this part of the Act is that, on the sale or exposure for sale of "imported" meat or bacon or lard, as above defined, the article must bear a label with the word "imported" and with a "word or words describing the country of origin," which must be easily legible (*ibidem*, s. 7 (*a*)). In the case of trays containing small portions of meat, partly home-killed and partly imported, sold mixed together, it is enough if there is a conspicuous notice affixed to the "slab, tray, or counter," on which is clearly printed "mixed home-killed and imported meat." There are several other exceptions or modifications of the general rule which we have not space to state. But obviously this part is intended to apply to imported meat, bacon, and lard provisions somewhat similar to those applied to imported manufactured goods by the Merchandise Marks Acts, the decisions under which, therefore, may be consulted with profit by any practitioner who has a case under the Order.

Part IV, which relates to jam, contains rather complicated provisions which we can only summarize. First, the soluble extract of jam in the commodity sold must be at least 65 per cent. of the jam. Secondly, not more than 10 per cent. of the jam shall consist of added fruit juice. Thirdly, where an additional fruit is added to the substantial ingredient, this must be clearly indicated; but if the additional fruit is less than 25 per cent. of the whole, it must not be named as an ingredient but as a "flavouring" substance. Fourthly, mixed jam so described need not comply with these provisions as to description of contents. And, lastly, "Rhubarb and Preserved Ginger," sold under that name, is given a special position of privilege provided the ginger is not less than 20 per cent. of the whole. In s. 10 there are provisions relating to "marmalade" and fixing its constituents. Section 11 provides (*inter alia*) for the name of the manufacturer, or the country of origin in the case of imported jam, on any "container" in which jam is sold. Section 12 compels the vendor of jam to keep and produce when required "books of account" to vouch for his compliance with the Order. And the fateful s. 13 defines jam as including also any "jelly, conserve, and marmalade." But the numerous provisions as to "jam" cannot be more than indicated here.

Part V, which relates to "Fats," is a less formidable compartment of the Act. It contains just four short sections. Section 14 forbids the sale of "dripping" manufactured by the "acid process." Section 15 forbids the sale (with certain exceptions) of any substance manufactured by the acid process from raw beef fat, except under the name of "Technical Tallow." Section 16 forbids the sale of edible fats (other than butter, margarine or dripping) which contain more than one-half per cent. of "free, fatty acids," or more than one-half per cent. of water and substances other then oil or fat. And s. 17, last but not least, provides that "margarine" must contain at least 80 per cent. of oil and fat.

Part VI, the General Part of the Order, is very important, inasmuch as it modifies—in the case of articles covered by Parts I to V—many of the general provisions of the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts 1875 to 1907. Sections 18, 19 and 20 give authority to prosecute to any local authority whatever controlling an area, provides for the taking of samples of food exposed for sale, and regulates the issue of an analyst's certificate of contents under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts. But s. 21 modifies the general rule, under those Acts, as to defences so completely that it is necessary to quote it in detail:—

> 21. (i) If in any proceedings for an infringement of any of the provisions of this Order (other than the provisions of Part I or Part III) the defendant proves:—
>
> (*a*) (1) in the case of proceedings under Part II, that he purchased the article in the package in which he sold the same or offered or exposed it for sale, and with a written warranty of the net weight of the article contained in the package, or with a statement on the package of such net weight,
>
> (2) in the case of proceedings under Part IV, that he sold or offered or exposed for sale the article in the container in which he bought it,
>
> (3) in the case of proceedings under Part V, that he bought the article with a written warranty as to such of the matters referred to in Part V, in respect of which it is proved that an offence has been committed,
>
> (*b*) in any case that he had no reason to believe that the article did not, as respects content, weight, description or labelling (as the case may be) comply with the provisions of this Order;
>
> (*c*) that he has given due notice to the prosecutor that he intends to rely upon the provisions of this clause;
>
> such person shall be entitled to be discharged from the prosecution.

Of the remaining sections, it is only necessary to notice that under the Order percentages must be calculated by weight (s. 22), that infringements are summary offences under the Ministry of Food (Continuance) Act, 1920 (s. 23), and that the Order does not apply to Ireland (s. 25 (*b*)), no doubt for very obvious reasons.

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Dementia Præcox in the New Criminology.

ENGLAND is a country where progression, in the administration of justice, as in science and in politics, is slow and orderly, but sure. Freedom, in the hackneyed lines of Tennyson, broadens slowly down from precedent to precedent. We do not try reckless experiments which have to be hastily abandoned; at least, in pre-war days we never did so. Of late years, perhaps, this statement is not quite so true of us as once it was. But even yet, *Festina lente* is our national motto, and a wise motto too. Hence it is that new movements generally arrive in England after they have been tried and proved successful elsewhere.

To this prudent and conservative feature of the national temperament, no doubt, is due the fact that in our system of jurisprudence modern ideas of criminology have made less advance than elsewhere. In the United States, in France, in Italy, in almost every continental country, to-day, we find that during the last ten years a revolution in the whole standpoint of criminology has been taking place. The criminal has been made the subject of careful and exact scientific study by trained and competent experts. Scotland Yard is content to take the finger-print impressions of each new suspect arrested; but in the Chicago Municipal Court—the leading exponent of the new criminology—they do much more than that. He is subjected to psycho-analytic tests and sociological tests for the purpose of ascertaining all relevant facts relating to his personal history, social environment, inherited tendencies, and mental capacity. The result has been most surprising. It has been found, as the result of bloodless and impartial laboratory tests, that nearly all persons accused of criminal offences (other than political sedition or financial fraud) have certain marked "neuroses" or mental nervous characteristics. They are very often, too, of low mental intelligence, but not always so. Indeed, it has become reasonably clear, as the result of these careful investigations, that ordinary crimes, especially sexual offences and crimes of violence, are the result of an unstable neurotic temperament. These can be partially combated, if the criminal is "caught young"—as Dr. Johnson used to say of Scotsmen.

From Chicago the new movement has spread all over the States and has penetrated to the European continent; England is the only great country not yet affected. Intelligence-testing is now the order of the day in the United States. An impartial report on each criminal, made in writing and filed in the index-room after elaborate and patient investigation, is submitted to the trial judge. He acts upon it in deciding the treatment to be accorded the accused. Generally speaking, it is recognised that in the case of most crimes deterrence of the criminal is practically impossible. He has not sufficient strength of will to be deterred by fear of consequences. He may dread a flogging or capital punishment or hard labour; may dislike them intensely, may even dread them in a cowardly manner; but at the moment of temptation he has not sufficient will power or mental stability to balance the one against the other. Indeed, at the moment of temptation, a curious psychical state arises in his mind, known to psycho-analysts as "protective forgetfulness"; which makes him "forget" unpleasant things, such as past or prospective punishment, however severe. A layer of consciousness surrounds his mind which blots out the recollection of pain in the past, and destroys the anticipation of it in the future. This resembles the "paralysis" which often affects the limbs of workmen who have suffered a severe traumatic injury or soldiers wounded in action; these were once put down to conscious malingering but are now known to be forms of "fear-shock" and quite genuine in their neurotic effect. Of course, deterrence has some effect, especially in the case of deliberately planned crimes committed by men of intelligence and force of character; but its effect is much less than might naturally be expected. In the case of robberies, murders committed in moments of passion, crimes of violence, and sexual crimes—all usually committed by mentally unstable persons—it has practically no effect of constraint. Judicial and popular beliefs to the contrary are a pure superstition, contrary to the evidence, and decisively rejected by all who have made a scientific study of criminal "neuroses" by patient experiment in actual cases.

On the other hand the criminal, if caught young, can often be partially or completely reformed. To explain why this is so, we must go into psychology. The normal mind consists of two separate masses, an outer and an inner. The outer mass consists of all those impulses and tendencies in the individual which are useful socially and which therefore have been gradually encouraged and built into a system of conduct by many psychical agencies; partly protective instincts, partly social institutions (such as home life, school discipline, religious teaching, public opinion, patriotism, and the like), and partly by deliberate moral discipline of himself by each individual. The inner mass consists of the aboriginal or native tendencies of each individual which have not proved socially useful and which therefore have become bottled up and repressed. These are driven into the sub-conscious mind, beneath the "threshold" of consciousness. There they are watched and kept under control by special protective organs of the mind. In a well-balanced and highly disciplined man or woman this process of guarding and subjugating the inner mass is fairly successful. But never completely so. There is always a tendency for the inner self to burst its bonds, rise up and overturn the disciplined life of even the very good man, leading to moral degeneracy or to a sudden act of evil or to madness.

But in normal citizens this rarely happens. In their case one of three results usually follows. First, the anti-social instincts may get "sublimated," *i.e.*, merged into some useful social instinct and thereby given a reasonably sufficient satisfaction to prevent their bursting the bonds and insisting on a satisfaction of their own. Thus the instinct of pugnacity may be satisfied by sports and military life; the primitive instinct of commandeering the property of others may be satisfied by the undertaking of some predatory form of business enterprise or the advocacy of social reforms which confiscate the property of others; the desire to capture a wife (strong in all primitive natures) may be satisfied by reading "strong man" romances or by watching these things dramatized in theatres; and so with other anti-social instincts. Secondly, these instincts may be "symbolized," *i.e.*, given a certain secondary and vicarious gratification by expressing them in art, poetry, music, and in other imaginative ways. Thirdly, they may be satisfied by expression in dreams, whether by night or day. Indeed, some quite normal men live a life of day-dreams. They perform their ordinary business, but all the time, as they walk in the streets or boat on the river or ride in motor cars, they are living in an alternative dream life in which all the incidents belong to a much more primitive age. Historical drama, and fiction dealing with savage or mediæval life, notoriously help less inventive minds to attain a similar satisfaction. And even unimaginative men, if they be people of a very regular and conventional and correct life, are apt to have continuous night-dreaming in which they perform anti-social parts. Of course, anti-social in this context means "not useful in the social life of to-day." Nearly all "anti-social" instincts were once useful in more primitive ages; had they not once been useful to the savage or the animal, they would not have been developed at all. Indeed, in human life, the struggle between good and evil, the social and the anti-social, is very largely (if not entirely) a struggle between the present good and the primitive good, that which is useful in present civilized society and that which was useful to the tribe in a much ruder age.

Now the opposite condition to that of the normal man is that of "demented" persons. The victim of "dementia," whether or not it amount to insanity, is essentially an unstable person who has not achieved the subjugation of his "inner" to his "outer life," of his dream-personality to his active social life. He is mentally unstable; in other words neurotic. Therefore each active impulse controls him just when it needs gratification. When the social impulses move him, he is social—and may be a noble patriot or a self-devoted hero, saving others from fire or drowning at the risk of his own life. When the anti-social impulse moves him, he assaults, murders, robs, and rapes. He simply cannot discipline or control his personality. This is known as "Dementia Præcox," and is now recognized by all competent modern criminologists as the essentially criminal type of mind.

THE MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL.

WHEN CALLED UPON TO ADVISE AS TO LEGACIES, PLEASE DO NOT FORGET THE CLAIMS OF THE MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL, WHICH IS URGENTLY IN NEED OF FUNDS FOR ITS HUMANE WORK.

It is made up of two characteristics which promote anti-social acts, namely, defective *intellection* and *defective affectivity*. Both can be partially controlled if the accused is treated at an early stage in his pathological history. Defective *intellection* can be cured by a carefully devised and long continued educational course in a suitable institution. *Defective affectivity* can be cured by impressing on the individual responsiveness to a healthy public opinion; this is also being achieved in reformative institutions. The great thing, however, is to avoid the repression of the "inner life" by the use of force and appeals to fear. These only concentrate it and make it much more violent; leading often to murder, or to insanity.

The definite scientific proof of these great truths is the work of the great Psycho-therapeutic Laboratory in Chicago Municipal Court, whose astonishing investigations and results have swept the United States by storm and are now copied in all the more enlightened of those states. The first successes of the movement began in 1912 when the Binet-Simon tests of intelligence began to be applied to juvenile criminals by Dr. Goddard, of Vineland, New Jersey. From 1913 to 1917 the Chicago court tested these methods in the face of an intensely sceptical judicial and legal opinion. The tests, the predictions, the cures, proved amazingly correct. The astonishing way in which scientific tests established the existence of certain clearly recognizable "neuroses," familiar to psycho-pathological physicians, in almost every case of crime (other than political or financial) was a revelation which gradually has convinced the legal opinion of the States. It cannot be long until English magistrates and judges begin to enquire into the new methods.

New Orders, &c.

Colonial Office.

It is officially announced that in view of the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, which allows the enforcement in England, Scotland, and Ireland of judgments obtained in any part of His Majesty's Dominions outside the United Kingdom to which the Act extends, the Legislatures of Cyprus and Gibralter have made reciprocal provisions for the enforcement therein of judgments obtained in the High Court in England, the Court of Session in Scotland and the High Court in Ireland.

An Order in Council has accordingly been issued extending Part II of the Act to Cyprus and Gibralter.

Colonial Office,
29th August, 1921.

Board of Trade Order.

FOOD CONTROL.

ORDER, DATED 25TH AUGUST, 1921, MADE BY THE BOARD OF TRADE UNDER THE MINISTRY OF FOOD (CONTINUANCE) ACT, 1920 (10 & 11 GEO. 5, c. 47), AND THE MINISTRY OF FOOD (CESSATION) ORDER, 1921, REVOKING CERTAIN ORDERS.

In exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the Ministry of Food (Continuance) Act, 1920, and the Ministry of Food (Cessation) Order, 1921, and of all other powers enabling them in that behalf, the Board of Trade hereby revoke as on the 1st September, 1921, the Orders mentioned in the Schedule hereto, but without prejudice to any proceedings in respect of any contravention thereof.

25th August, 1921.

SCHEDULE.

S.R. & O., 1919, No. 927.	The Intoxicating Liquor (Output and Delivery) Order, No. 2, 1919.
S.R. & O., 1919, No. 1730.	The Spirits (Restriction on Sales) Order, 1919.
S.R. & O., 1920, No. 531.	The Spirits (Prices and Description) Order, 1920.
S.R. & O., 1920, No. 540.	The Beer (Prices and Description) Order, 1920.
S.R. & O., 1921, No. 35.	The Beer and Spirits (Prices and Description) Amendment Order, 1921.
S.R. & O., 1919, No. 1112.	The Misdescription of Maximum Prices Order, 1919.

WAR COMPENSATION COURT.

Notice is hereby given, that under Section 2 (1) (ii) of the Indemnity Act, 1920, the War Compensation Court will not be able to entertain any claim which has not been lodged on the form prescribed by the Court, in original with the Department of State responsible for the interference alleged and a copy with the Court, by the 31st August, 1922, unless the transaction giving rise to the claim takes place after the 31st August, 1921, in which event the claim may be lodged as above stated within one year from the date of the transaction.

2nd September, 1921.

NEW DRUG REGULATIONS.

The Dangerous Drugs Act which came into force yesterday, while aimed primarily at the illicit drug traffic, will affect the general public. It is now an offence for anyone to have in his possession any preparation containing at least one part in 500 of morphine or one in 1,000 of heroin, cocaine, or opium. These regulations do not apply where the owner is licensed or the drugs are supplied on a doctor's prescription. Pure paregoric and laudanum come within the regulations, but paregoric as generally used is so diluted that it can be sold without a prescription or permit.

WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY.

It is officially announced that in consequence of the lapse of Regulation 22 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, so far as Great Britain is concerned, any apparatus for wireless telegraphy may now be sold (or purchased, made, or held) in Great Britain (but not in Ireland) without permit or restriction. The Postmaster-General's authority is, however, still necessary under the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904, before any wireless apparatus may be installed or worked.

All persons who have suffered loss or damage due to direct enemy action, and who have not already lodged their claims with the Reparation Claims Department of the Royal Commission, are requested to do so forthwith at Cornwall House, Stamford-street, S.E.1, for submission to the Commission. Forms of claim may be obtained at Cornwall House.

N.B. During the remainder of September, accompanied by my art expert, I shall be visiting the Channel Islands and the West of England. Whether your home is a castle or a cottage I will call, and for a fee of 21s. will tell you in about 30 minutes the value of, say, the miniature, the picture, vase, commode, silver, jewels, or stamps, and state what you may expect at auction for your treasures. Valuations for Probate, Insurance, Divisions, at moderate fees.—W. E. HURCOMB, Calder House (corner of Dover Street), Piccadilly, W.1.

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Legal News.

Dissolution.

JAMES SCOTT DUCKERS and WILLIAM HENRY THOMPSON (Scott, Duckers & Thompson), Solicitors, 2, New-court, Carey-street, Chancery-lane, W.C.2. 31st day of August, 1921. [*Gazette*, 6th September.

General.

At Clerkenwell Police Court recently at the close of the morning session, Mr. Waddy, the presiding magistrate, referred to the retirement of Mr. Bros, the Metropolitan Police Magistrate. He said that Mr. Bros had sat at that Court for thirty-three years with a quiet dignity that had earned the esteem and affection of everybody associated with him in his public work. Mr. Bros, accompanied by his son, Major Bros, afterwards entered the Court, and bade farewell to the solicitors, court missionaries, officials, and police officers assembled. Mr. J. R. W. Bros, who is eighty years of age, was called to the Bar in 1866, and was appointed Police Magistrate at Clerkenwell in 1888.

At Chertsey Revision Court the Byfleet Overseers objected to the claims of two Oxford undergraduates to be on the voters' list, on the ground that for eight weeks during the qualifying period they had been at Oxford. On their behalf it was pointed out that they had rooms at their father's house which were kept for them, and could be occupied at any time. The Revising Barrister (Mr. R. O. B. Lane) said that on the facts they would be entitled to be on the register, but he would not allow the votes, as their applications gave the wrong dates for the qualifying period. With correct applications they would get on the next register.

As the result of a midnight visit to a Chinese laundry at Pontypridd two Chinamen have been brought before the local court charged with landing in this country without the permission of the immigration officer. They were remanded.

The Manchester City Treasurer has been served with orders of the Court for payment of the costs of the prosecution of Sinn Feiners at the recent Manchester Assizes, amounting to over £4,338. The town clerk advises that, as the case was one of national importance, an attempt should be made to obtain repayment from the National Treasury

The Commissioner of Police has decided to allow strap-hanging in omnibuses and tramcars, which was due to cease on 1st October, to continue pending the provision of the number of vehicles necessary to meet the needs of the travelling public.

VALUATIONS FOR INSURANCE.—It is very essential that all Policy Holders should have a detailed valuation of their effects. Property is generally very inadequately insured, and in case of loss insurers suffer accordingly. **DEBENHAM STORR & SONS (LIMITED)**, 26, King Street, Covent Garden, W.C.2, the well-known chattel valuers and auctioneers (established over 100 years), have a staff of expert Valuers, and will be glad to advise those desiring valuations for any purpose. Jewels, plate, furs, furniture, works of art, bric-à-brac a speciality.—[ADVT.]

Winding-up Notices.

JOINT STOCK COMPANIES.

LIMITED IN CHANCERY.

CREDITORS MUST SEND IN THEIR CLAIMS TO THE LIQUIDATOR AS NAMED ON OR BEFORE THE DATE MENTIONED.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, September 2.

DELACOMBE, MARECHAL & HERVIEU LTD. Sept. 26. R. F. W. Fincham, 3 Warwick-ct., Gray's Inn.
STONE & OLIVER (EAST AFRICA) LTD. Sept. 30. A. A. Lowe, 12, Coleman-st.
HARDY, BANSON & CO. LTD. Oct. 21. W. Nicholson, 12, Wood-st., E.C.
WASTE FUEL RECOVERY BRIQUETTE CO. LTD. Sept. 30. H. W. Brettell, 11, Waterloo-st., Birmingham.
COOK & HAWORTH LTD. Sept. 21. H. E. Lord, Wrexham Chambers, Prestatyn.
JOHN MINKS & SONS LTD. Oct. 8. W. S. Deyes, 10, Cook-st., Liverpool.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, September 6.

HOLLEY BROTHERS CARBURETTOR CO. LTD. Oct. 15. H. C. Chambers, 6, Bennett's-hill, Birmingham.
THE YORKSHIRE WAREHOUSE CO. (SHEFFIELD) LTD. Sept. 21. Mr. J. S. Hancock, 57, Surrey-st., Sheffield.
NEWGATE FOUNDRY LTD. Sept. 16. H. Wood, 87, Newgate-st., Bishop Auckland.
ARCHD. MACKENZIE (LONDON) LTD. Oct. 10. F. G. Van de Linde, 4, Fenchurch-av.
KINGSTON AND BEARMAN LTD. Sept. 9. B. V. Clerke, 63, Finsbury-pavement.
ELLTERCEE CLOTHING CO. LTD. Sept. 16. W. Lacon Threlford, 120, London Wall, E.C.2.
JAMES HOY & SON LTD. Sept. 30. A. E. Weaver, 2, Mount-st., Manchester.
COVENTRY SIMPLEX ENGINES LTD. Oct. 7. E. Noel Humphreys, Old Bank Buildings, Eastgate, Chester.

Resolutions for Winding-up Voluntarily.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, September 2.

C. Coombs & Co. Ltd.
Somerleyton Brick Co. Ltd.
Les Capucines Ltd.
Reest Hall & Co. Ltd.
The Rath Shipping Co. Ltd.
E. A. Da Costa & Co. Ltd.
Pecks Ltd.
Sandy Reed & Co. Ltd
The Provincial Metal Co. Ltd.
Tox Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Cook & Haworth Ltd.
New Caepoutbren Colliery Co. Ltd.
W. H. Clutterbuck & Sons Ltd.
Youngmans Ltd.
Gard Marr & Co. Ltd.
Société Générale Pour La Finance et L'Industrie.
The General Phosphate Co. Ltd.
Stone & Oliver (East Africa) Ltd.
B. Blix & Co. Ltd.
Motor Yacht Fishing and Pleasure Co. (Whitby) Ltd.
Church-Street (St. Helens) Picture House Ltd.
Wadkin Mills & Co. Ltd.
John Minks & Sons Ltd.
Anglo-Adriatic Trading Co. Ltd.
"Newera" Concrete Construction Co. Ltd.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, September 6.

Importex Ltd.
The English Canned Fruit Co. Ltd.
J. Keele Ltd.
Holley Brothers Carburettor Co. Ltd.
Warren & Co. (South Shields) Ltd.
James Walker & Co. Ltd.
St. Helens Union Loan Co. Ltd.
W. R. K. Syndicate Ltd
James Hoy & Son Ltd.
Irish Packing Co. Ltd.
The Inlaid Wood and Allied Arts Manufacturing Co. Ltd.
Salisbury & District Motor Services Ltd.
J. & S. Harris & Co. Ltd.
Sadler & Watton Ltd.
G. N. Ltd.
Kingston & Bearman Ltd.
Kelly Export Co. Ltd.
Abram Lyle & Sons Ltd.
Carrock Syndicate Ltd.
The Anglo-Belgian Aviation and Mechanical Co. Ltd.
Anyaw Exploitation Co. Ltd.

Bankruptcy Notices.

London Gazette.—FRIDAY, September 2.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

ADKINS, ARTHUR, Bury. Bolton. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
ASHTON, EDWIN, Doncaster. Sheffield. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
BARRACLOUGH, FRANK, Lightcliffe, near Halifax. Salford. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
BARRATT, JOHN, Stockport. Stockport. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
BEARD, C. S., Hove. Brighton. Pet. Aug. 12. Ord. Aug. 31.
BEATLEY, T. G., AND SON, Basinghall-st. High Court. Pet. June 20. Ord. Sept. 1.
BODMAN, SIDNEY A., Calne. Swindon. Pet. Aug. 13. Ord. Aug. 31.
BROWN, JOHN S., Gateshead. Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
BROWN, JOSEPH, Skegness. Boston. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
CREESE, WILLIAM, Walthamstow. High Court. Pet. July 25. Ord. Aug. 29.
DANDRIDGE, GEORGE, Woolwich. Greenwich. Pet. July 15. Ord. Aug. 30.
FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN, Bucklersbury. High Court. Pet. July 8. Ord. Aug. 29.
GIBBONS, JOHN, Castleford. Wakefield. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
HARRAP, WILLIAM, Horbury. Wakefield. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
HAYHURST, OLIVER, Ribchester, near Longridge. Preston. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
HULME, HENRY, Widnes. Liverpool. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
JACOBS, MYER, Shoreditch. High Court. Pet. July 27. Ord. Aug. 31.
KATIN, JERROLD, Eastbourne. Eastbourne. Pet. Aug. 13. Ord. Aug. 30.
LINSLEY, WILLIAM, Durham. Durham. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
LONGBOTTOM, ROBERT B., Meltham. Huddersfield. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
LONGMATE, WALTER, Devonshire-st., W. High Court. Pet. July 28. Ord. Aug. 31.
MILLINGTON, ARTHUR W., Newport. Newport (Mon.). Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
PARKER, GRACE, Pontypridd. Pontypridd. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
POWELL, GEORGE W., West Didsbury. Manchester. Pet. Aug. 18. Ord. Aug. 31.
PRATT, WILLIAM C., Shepton Mallet. Wells. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
PUGH, CATHERINE, Ynyshir, Glam. Pontypridd. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
SUTCLIFFE, JAMES W., Halifax. Halifax. Pet. Aug. 18. Ord. Aug. 29.
THOMPSON, WILLIAM, Gateshead. Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Pet. Aug. 18. Ord. Aug. 31.
TROUTMAN, FREDERICK O., Leicester. Leicester. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
TRUE, RONALD, Southsea. Portsmouth. Pet. Aug. 5. Ord. Aug. 26.

EVIDENCE
on behalf of Christianity is provided by the
CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE SOCIETY,
33 and 34, Craven Street, W.C.2.

WATSON, ROBERT F., Sowerby. Northallerton. Pet. Aug. 27. Ord. Aug. 27.
WATTS, CHARLES J., Eynsham. Oxford. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
WEBSTER, PERCY W., Leamington Spa. Warwick. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
WELLESLEY, HAROLD, Lee, Kent. Greenwich. Pet. July 14. Ord. Aug. 31.
WENSOE, J. W., Colchester. Colchester. Pet. Aug. 13. Ord. Aug. 27.
WOOD, ALFRED, Codnor, Derby. Derby. Pet. Aug. 25. Ord. Aug. 25.

RECEIVING ORDERS.

London Gazette.—TUESDAY, September 6.

ADCOCK, FREDERICK L., Wordsley. Stourbridge. Pet. Aug. 29. Ord. Aug. 29.
ALLEN, H., Bishopsgate. High Court. Pet. June 7. Ord. Sept. 2.
BARKER, GEORGE W., Leicester. Leicester. Pet. Sept. 2. Ord. Sept. 2.
BARTON-JAYNE, CHARLES, Victoria-st. High Court. Pet. May 23. Ord. Sept. 2.
BOREHAM, E. ST. JOHN, Fulham. High Court. Pet. July 11. Ord. Sept. 2.
BRADLEY, ALICE, Halifax. Halifax. Pet. Sept. 3. Ord. Sept. 3.
CANHAM, ERNEST G., Langley. Cambridge. Pet. Sept. 1. Ord. Sept. 1.
CHATTERTON, EDGAR, and PELL, CHARLES, Louth. Great Grimsby. Pet. Aug. 30. Ord. Aug. 30.
CURTIS, AMBY, Salperton. Cheltenham. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.
HILL, RALPH, Balham. Wandsworth. Pet. July 19. Ord. Sept. 1.
HOWE, RALPH L., Muswell Hill. High Court. Pet. Sept. 1. Ord. Sept. 2.
MASTERS, THOMAS, Grimsby. Great Grimsby. Pet. Aug. 16. Ord. Aug. 30.
MATTINGLY, HUBERT F. C., East Castle-st. High Court. Pet. July 25. Ord. Sept. 1.
MCGRATH, WILLIAM, Manchester. Manchester. Pet. Sept. 1. Ord. Sept. 1.
PARSONS, ROBERT, Goswell-rd. High Court. Pet. July 28. Ord. Sept. 1.
PITT, H., Prittlewell. Chelmsford. Pet. July 27. Ord. Sept. 2.
WEBSTER, JOSEPH, Leeds. Leeds. Pet. July 12. Ord. Sept. 2.
WILLIAMS, HUGH, Amlwch Port. Bangor. Pet. Aug. 27. Ord. Aug. 27.
WILSON, ANTHONY F., Renwick. Carlisle. Pet. Sept. 3. Ord. Sept. 3.
WOODYARD, HARRY G., Townend, Writtle. Chelmsford. Pet. Aug. 31. Ord. Aug. 31.

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THE FOOD REFORM RESTAURANT,
2 & 3, FURNIVAL STREET, HOLBORN.

IT is very important that one's Keys should be registered by a reliable Company. You should ring up 1445 Clerkenwell to-day, and ask the British Key Registry about it, or write London Office, 64, Finsbury Pavement, E.C.2.

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